Somehow, there are actually more closers available than teams chasing them.
And no, that's not some crazy hallucination. Do the math for yourself.
Available as free agents: Francisco Rodriguez, Brian Fuentes, Trevor Hoffman, Kerry Wood and, depending on how you look at them in your bullpen neighborhood, Jason Isringhausen, Brandon Lyon, Eric Gagne and Juan Cruz. There's also Chad Cordero, who is coming off shoulder surgery and is iffy for Opening Day.
Also, potentially available on the trade market: J.J. Putz, Bobby Jenks, George Sherrill, Huston Street, Jose Valverde and Matt Capps.
That's 15 names, and 12 of those players (all but Street, Gagne and Cruz) have saved more than 20 games in at least one of the past two seasons.
But how many teams are actively looking for a closer? You might be shocked by how short that list is.
You have the Mets, Indians, Brewers, Rangers, Tigers and maybe the Cardinals, if it's the right short-term fit. So that's six teams.
about 3 years ago
Jay
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Good news, I think. But, I don’t think the Indians are likely to be competitive for the top free agent closers, since you have the Mets, Rangers, Tigers and Cards in there (all of whom probably are willing to spend a lot more money than the Indians). So, if closer is a priority, it may mean a trade (or settling for an iffy free agent closer, again). The guys on the trade list are very interesting, although it’s unlikely we could get Jenks, so that’s one name not really on OUR list of possibles.
The Tigers aren’t going to spend $10M on a closer. The Brewers were prepared to do so on Francisco Cordero before he signed with the Reds, but now they’ll have to replace Sabathia and Sheets. I doubt they can spend big on a closer. The Cards seemingly have the cash. The Rangers and Mets certainly do.
I see the Mets going big on either Fuentes or KRod. And I see the Rangers going big on Kerry Wood. I say no on Lyon and Gagne. Izzy, if healthy, is attractive because he’s cheap. But I’d rather go with Hoffman than Izzy considering health. Valverde is too volatile and a year away from free agency. Why give up talent AND lose the guy after a year?
Matt Capps is the sleeper. If he’s available for a reasonable cost, he’s worth it considering he’s under control through 2011. I wish KRod would just sign with the Mets so the rest of the market will fall into place.
They could, considering the final offer to Trevor Hoffman three offseasons ago was for 3 years, $32M.
But my point is that if the top-talent closers can’t secure big contracts from the big spenders, there will be a trickle-down effect. This should leave otherwise unavailable talents more accessible, and probably for a lower cost. Even if Cleveland isn’t in the market for a $10M per season closer, they can grab a non-reconstruction project.
Yeah, but alternating save situations between your two closers doesn’t seem look a good idea. Besides, what’s one closer going to do on days when the other is going to have a save situation?
by Peter Bendix on Nov 24, 2008 1:42 PM EST up reply actions
I would argue that a setup man is as important as the closer in today’s beisbol. You technically need two closers to be a playoff team.
I really think the home-alternate block-C logos should be outlined in white, like that one. That’s definitely my favorite of the T-shirt jerseys.
by fleerdon on Nov 24, 2008 6:08 PM EST up reply actions
I got that jersey with Sizemore on the back last year.
Haven’t been that excited for something to arrive in the mail since…ever.
by The DiaTriber on Nov 24, 2008 9:32 PM EST up reply actions
I’ll bet. those are super nice. The new ones have really grown on me too, though. Just got an authentic Grady home alternate for $60 off eBay!
Burn on, big river, burn on...
by Turkmenbashi on Nov 25, 2008 2:17 PM EST up reply actions
I was being facetious. The idea that a team can only have one “closer” is absurd.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 24, 2008 5:08 PM EST up reply actions
Tell me if this doesn’t make sense, but to me this seems to be an argument for trying to get a guy who’s a relatively low injury risk and maybe bargaining with years, or trading for a guy who will be under control for a while. If it’s really a buyer’s market, which seems rare when it comes to closers, then shouldn’t we try to get something a little longer term while prices figure to be lower than in other years? It’s not that I don’t have faith in Miller and/or Stomp as closers of the future, but whoever we get stands to have more value later, if we decide to unload him, I would think…
I’m currently high on Matt Capps, simply based on a glance at his recent stats (2008: K/BB=7.80, ERA+=137, opp. OPS=.633, HR/9=0.84; 2007: K/BB=4.00, ERA+=191, opp OPS=.582, HR/9=0.57), the sense that he’s kind of under the radar (though obviously that may not mean when you’re talking about real live GMs), the fact that he plays for Pittsburgh, who I assume would be interested in prospects to supplement a deal, and the fact that he’d be under control for the next 3 seasons (as xrickx points out). From what I can tell, it seems like the Pirates are looking for a righty bat, and SP. Not sure if we’re a good fit, since our SP depth is young and untested, and I’m not sure how much someone like, say, Francisco is worth, but…maybe? I don’t have a good sense of what it would take to land Capps, but he certainly seems like someone worth exploring.
I suppose one problem with this could be that a buyer’s market seems less likely to affect prices in a trade than in signing free agents, if the selling team doesn’t have to trade the guy. Not sure what the case is with Capps, but it could be a factor.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 24, 2008 2:05 PM EST up reply actions
I disagree with this. I think that the best way to take advantage of a buyer’s market on relievers is by offering a short-term deal to several of those guys. I think that because it’s a buyer’s market, they may be willing to sacrifice some length.
Normally, I’d agree with your logic: let’s maximize our investment by getting someone under control for more years. However, relievers are incredibly volatile, in terms of both injury and performance. You can count on one hand (okay, maybe two) the number of relievers who have been very good and injury free for more than three consecutive seasons.
As for Capps specifically, I agree that he looks to be an excellent value (assuming he put his injury woes of 2008 behind him). Unfortunately for us, Neal Huntington probably can’t be easily taken advantage of. While Huntington would probably deal Capps in the right deal, he also understands Capps’s value and would probably want more from us than we are willing to pay – especially considering that there are so many other bullpen options out there.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 24, 2008 2:10 PM EST up reply actions
If the cost of free agent closers is going to be reasonable, I can’t see trading valuable talent to get one.
These are both good points. My original suggestion was predicated on the assumption that trade prices would go down by comparable amounts to free agent prices, which is probably not the case.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 12:48 PM EST up reply actions
I don’t think your point is wrong but I have a different take. I’d rather trade for a closer and invest our limited funds in a starting pitcher like Sheets or an IF like Orlando Hudson.( I’m specifically mentioning these two players because I think we have a chance to sign either, unlike other free agents).
My rationale behind this is that there are several trade targents at closer and relatively few at IF and SP. This means two things. First, if we spend most of our money on a closer we probably won’t have enough to sign anyone else. Maybe we sign sign a bargin bin FA, maybe we get lucky but probably not.
Second, a quality infielder or starting pitcher is going to cost a lot more than a closer, and that’s before you factor in the scarcity in the market. Given the surplus of both FA closers and closers available for trade, we might be able to get a better deal on a trade. I’m not saying we’ll gets someone like Putz for nothing, but even a small discount is better than none.
by world dictator on Nov 25, 2008 1:41 PM EST up reply actions
I don’t understand your point. If the price of FA closers is below the trade price for closers, but the price of SP or IF is high (due to the relative scarcity of those positions), wouldn’t it make sense to save our prospects for SP and IF trades, since using them for a closer would be overpaying compared to a FA closer?
That was a hell of a sentence… sorry.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 1:49 PM EST up reply actions
If we put “Kevin Millwood-type deal” into the contract language, then we should sign Gagne. He’d be a sure thing!
I have no interest in Gagne. None. I would strongly prefer to not have him. I was just trying to poke at bears with sticks.
Rarr.
Don't forget to pay your parking ticket.
by TheVanillaGorilla on Nov 24, 2008 8:34 PM EST up reply actions 1 recs
rec
Anti-Ben Fran before it was cool.
by Gradyforpresident on Nov 25, 2008 1:40 AM EST up reply actions
not about gagne
Anti-Ben Fran before it was cool.
by Gradyforpresident on Nov 25, 2008 1:40 AM EST up reply actions
I’m curious about what the group thinks:
Club X has a vacancy at closer, and an ordinary bunch of pre-arbitration relievers, some with prior closing experience and the upside of being more than competent at the position, not unlike Fuentes or Jenks or any number of relievers were before they’d acquired the label “closer”. The downside is that they’re “untested”.
Club X has a potentially solid rotation, but like almost all rotations relative excellence in the 4th and 5th spots are anything but assured.
There’s a first-rate FA closer—predictably among the 10 best in the league—who requires 4 x $13 million, and a free agent SP who’s predictably among the 60 best in the league who requires a similar amount. There’s a “hole” at closer, and there is no obvious “hole” in the rotation, just a normal degree of uncertainty. Whom do you prioritize?
Helium Watch: Chuck Lofgren, OF
I think the obvious answer is starting pitcher. History have shown that closers are much easier to come by, as you stated above. Many good relief pitchers, and even failed starting pitchers, have become “proven closers.” I think paying big money for a veteren closer is not as well spent as paying for a middle-of-the-order starter. Holes in the bullpen are much easier to fill than holes in the rotation.
The best thing probably is to hit [Grady] 2nd -- Jay
by Buckeye Brad on Nov 24, 2008 7:23 PM EST up reply actions
Agreed. Not to mention, relief pitchers are notoriously volatile, making them quite risky (in terms of both performance and injury).
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 10:21 AM EST up reply actions
I’m not sure which team you’re describing, hypothetically. It’s not the Indians, I fear. They have two established major league starters, one of whom had a lousy season and needs to show he can be consistent. They have a whole bunch of guys competing for the other three spots; none of them has done anything more than show promise. They also have a guy who did a decent job of closing games in a short trial, but about whom everyone, rightly, has questions.
The Indians need to prioritize pitching …. period. If they have only one bullet in their gun, I’d go for the starter and hope that they can patch together a solid bullpen, as they’ve done in the past, at times.
I also think pitching is a priority, but like you I suspect that there’s only one bullet in the chamber (but here will always be a shovel for the scrap heap).
Assuming the reports about the declining demands are true, these relievers are sounding more attractive. Instinctively I favor Lohse to Fuentes if it comes down to it, because the gulf between backup closers and starters is so great, and it seems that every season a Tom Mastny has to make an emergency spot start and gets rocked.
Or should I buy what’s said about Joe Nathan, that having the go-to closer in a dedicated role has the effect of stabilizing the whole ‘pen. If that’s true, then maybe I need to rethink the worth of those 70+ innings?
Helium Watch: Chuck Lofgren, OF
The problem is, $13M annually gets you a whole lot more “closer” than it does “starter.” I’d rather have Brian Fuentes than Kyle Lohse, and they’re both going to cost me the same on a yearly basis.
At the end of the day, yo have to choose pieces based on how they fit together. I don’t think you’ve said anything counter to that belief. What closer the Indians employ in 2009 will depend a lot on if they can add a starting pitcher. And that depends on what infielder, if any, they add. The infielder seems to be their priority, which I think means, at least through free agency, that a closer will be the other big signing. Then, maybe some of the extra pieces (Gutierrez, Francisco, Lewis, Sower) and prospects can be used to target a starting pitcher.
I don’t disagree about what a given amount of money will buy. But, I really do worry about the Indians starting pitching. Going with one veteran guy and 4 very young pitchers (including Carmona) is a huge gamble to take. Even if the starter they add isn’t a great pitcher (i.e., someone like Paul Byrd was a couple of years ago), having someone in the rotation who is dependable, can get into the sixth inning consistently, and can settle the rest of the staff down is a big plus. It also makes the bullpen better, since you don’t need so many innings out of them.
My real point is that the priority should be the pitching (be it starting or relief). I agree that you need to see what’s available and use your money to do the most good. I’m really not sure I agree with the apparent emphasis on getting an infielder. Sure, the infield isn’t perfect. But, last year’s team struggled because of pitching — relief pitching primarily. Then, they traded away 2/5 of the starting rotation and a third guy is out until at least mid-summer. I won’t be upset with either a good reliever or a good starter, as long as it’s a pitcher.
It gets you more closer because closers are far less valuable to the team, simply because of the relative amount of innings each pitcher will contribute.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 10:20 AM EST up reply actions
No no, that’s the wrong comparison. Don’t compare a $10M closer with a $10M starter. Compare what a $10M starter gets you relative to other starters, then compare with a $10M closer gets you relative to other closers.
Coco Cordero and Eric Gagne aside, the $10M is Rivera, Nathan, K-Rod. That’s the cream of the crop in the closer world. For $10M, you’re getting a near lock in the closers role. On the flip side, $10M gets you Meche, Lohse, Silva, Padilla….there’s some upside, but the real established talent (now) is with the $17M+ starters.
Your point is correct, but I think the application is incorrect. The closer market is such that the $10 million closer is now Fuentes (and he may get more). Nathan is making $11.25 mil this year on a contract he signed with a significant home-town discount. Rivera is making $15 mil. K-Rod is probably going to get $12-15 mil.
I’d much rather have Derek Lowe for $16 mil a year than Brian Fuentes for $10 mil, or K-Rod for $12-15.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 11:29 AM EST up reply actions
I was using general dollar amounts. Rivera at $15M is the outlier, just like Posada at $13M per season and Pettite at $16M is an outlier. The Yankees overpaid because Hank and Hal couldn’t have Yankee “legends” leave the first year they took over for their father. The going rate for a top closer is $10-$12M.
I’m in 100% agreement that a starter is more valuable as a closer. But I’d avoid paying top dollar for a starter of Lowe’s caliber (Lowe, back in the AL, is Jake Westbrook at best). Fuentes makes a bigger impact on the Indians’ bullpen than Lowe does on their starting rotation. I think people overlook just how dominant Fuentes has been the last four seasons.
I think you’re misunderestimating Lowe. But that’s beside the point that we’re discussing.
Relievers are so volatile The fact that Fuentes has been so consistently good is the exception, not the rule. Thus, I’m hesitant to pay the “going rate” – not necessarily because it’s overpaying, per se, but because that money is accompanied by a significant amount of performance risk.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 11:46 AM EST up reply actions
Fuentes makes a bigger impact on the Indians’ bullpen than Lowe does on their starting rotation
But….that’s still not a fair comparison. The bullpen isn’t an equal part of the team to the starting rotation.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 11:53 AM EST up reply actions
Right… $10M is the upper end of closers because “closers are far less valuable to the team”.
It seems to me that closers are overpriced relative to starters, if you normalize the salaries by innings pitched. It’s not terribly extreme to say that a healthy starter could pitch 3 times as many innings as a healthy closer.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 11:43 AM EST up reply actions
I agree that starters are more valuable. But a closer can lose a lot more games for you than can a starter. And this all falls under my unsupported notion that an impeccable or a terrible bullpen is the easiest way to trick your pythagorean record.
The Indians, if they want to avoid having this yearly extreme fluctuation of bullpen effectiveness, are going to have to pay a free agent or trade for a reliable bullpen talent. Jay put it best…top bullpen talent costs money. If they aren’t top bullpen talent, their probably just an unpredictable bullpen arm, which is more commonly called a “reliever.” Some years, (2005 and 2007), relievers just all click. Other years (2006 and 2008), they all bomb.
I think closers are made and not born. I think the Indians can develop their own closer. But there’s nothing wrong with the Indians spending some cash in the next few years while they see if one of Miller, Meloan, or Lewis can be a predictable arm. Once they are, you move them into the role. It’s that bullpen continuity that I think best promotes success in a bullpen that is otherwise subject to extreme volatility by the very nature of the job.
I have no doubt you’re right that the bullpen is the biggest influence on the difference between Pythagorean and actual record, but the rotation is a much bigger influence on the Pythagorean record itself…
Similarly, a closer can only lose games that the starter put you in a position to win. If you don’t have good starters, you’re not going to be using your closer a whole lot.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 11:56 AM EST up reply actions
Great point about starters have much more influence on overall Pythag.
Also, <a href=“For more information, please visit ”http://www.tufts.edu/vet/ce/" target="_blank">http://www.tufts.edu/vet/ce/" >here is a Hardball Times article illustrating that while bullpens can cause teams to over/under-perform their pythag, they really don’t make that much of a difference.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:15 PM EST up reply actions
Interesting, thanks. If I read this correctly, it seems to support my point below that the variance in Pythagorean differential is pretty small, and even moreso the variance that can actually be predicted at this point. Compared to the predictable variance in the Pythag itself, it seems like the better strategy is one that seeks to improve the Pythag rather than the differential. Obviously you’d like to do both simultaneously, but if you have to choose…
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 1:05 PM EST up reply actions
That’s my understanding as well.
Bullpens can have an effect on pythag, but they haven’t been showed to allow you to beat by 8 wins a year, for example.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:22 PM EST up reply actions
I have no doubt you’re right that the bullpen is the biggest influence on the difference between Pythagorean and actual record, but the rotation is a much bigger influence on the Pythagorean record itself
True, but the goal isn’t to have the best Pyth record, it’s to have the best record.
Most of the time, we can discuss those two goals as being nearly the same thing, very closely correlated. But the whole point of buying a premium reliever is to lock down actual Wins, i.e., to prevent the one or two runs that will actually be a swing of one win vs. one loss in the standings. At that point in the game, those one or two runs = one win = 10 Pythagorean runs.
Yeah … really.
By the way, this is the inverse of another key finding, which is that having an unusually deep bullpen actually hurts Pythagorean efficiency. Your sixth and seventh reliever aren’t going to impact many actual Wins, so they can prevent an extra 30 runs while achieving 0 extra wins, which is has the same impact of anyone else on the team scoring or preventing 0 runs. The key example being our 2005 bullpen, which turned about a dozen games from 5-run losses into 1-run and 2-run losses.
That is true, but there are also examples where teams can turn 4 run wins into 9 run wins, etc.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:43 PM EST up reply actions
Which still leaves you with the same amount of wins. It does improve your team in the sense that you give up fewer runs. But it doesn’t necessarily improve your team in the "W’ column. And I think that’s the point.
Saving the one run when you’re about to win is different than saving one run in the third inning. A run is still a run and they count the same. But that’s why SLG has value. In a tie game in the 9th inning, a solo HR gives you the win. A single gives you…a base runner. Still a good thing…but not the same thing.
the goal isn’t to have the best Pyth record, it’s to have the best record.
Of course it is, but you can partition your actual record into two independent components: your Pythagorean record, and your deviation from your Pythagorean record. I’m suggesting that the variance of the deviations from the Pythag are relatively small, compared to the variances in the Pythag itself. So if you have a choice between having a good Pythagorean record (say, in the top 10) but underperforming it (say, in the bottom 10), or having a bad Pythagorean record but overperforming it (by comparative amounts), I would take the former. That is, I suspect that teams who fall into the former category have better actual records on average.
Now, of course, your point about high-leverage runs stands, and we have to ask whether paying, say, $15M for a starter affects your Pythagorean rankings as much as spending $10M on a closer affects your over/underperformance of your Pythag, but if it does, I think it’s probably the better investment….
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 12:44 PM EST up reply actions
Just because you can partition it that way doesn’t mean that that’s the best prism through which to view a critical decision.
In general, you’re going for Pythagorean wins as you build your roster, not only because they’re “better” but also because you have no choice. In the bullpen, the opposite is true.
Now, do I think that a “leveraged win” is as good as a Pythagorean win? No, of course not. Most of those leveraged wins, you were going to win anyway. But the fact remains, it’s silly to judge relievers by Pyth wins added — this is like judging them with ERA — just as it’s silly to judge the ultimate quality of a hitter using BA/RISP. They are different roles with different demands.
I’ll tell you this, though, I’ll take the old Rafi Betancourt — consistently very good and never great — over the new one, amazing one year and awful the next. With relievers, consistency itself may be the most scarce commodity, and the search for it may basically be a snipe hunt.
it’s silly to judge relievers by Pyth wins added
Okay, but that wasn’t really the discussion we were having. We were trying to compare the value of a starter to that of a closer. The reason Pythagorean wins/differentials came up was because xrickx appeared to be emphasizing the importance of “tricking” your Pythagorean record, and advanced signing a good closer as a good way to do so.
The premise was that a closer would improve your Pythagorean differential, whereas a starter would improve your actual Pythagorean wins.
I’ll agree with you that if we’re restricting our discussion to the bullpen, then Pythagorean wins is not that valuable. But to compare the value of bullpen to rotation, we need some way of comparing the things that starters contribute to to the things that relievers contribute to. If that plays out as Pyth wins vs. Pyth differential (which is just one simplistic possibility that came up), that’s going to favor the starters.
I guess I just haven’t seen anything in what you’ve said so far that is an argument for prioritizing a closer over a starter.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 1:22 PM EST up reply actions
Basically, I think the important thing is to recognize that Pyth is a very blunt instrument, with a very high correlation on the most macro level and very little value beyond that.
In other words, you can’t go around tweaking your Pyth variance for its own sake. For any decision, you have to bring the factors back to the simple goal of winning games, and while Pyth record is very useful in measuring that for many decisions, for others it should be ignored entirely.
I don’t know who I’m agreeing or disagreeing with at this point, but that’s what I think.
I’ll agree with this. I was only discussing it because it had been brought up.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 1:27 PM EST up reply actions
The other thing is that Pyth record isn’t all that strong of a measure for starters, either. I think you’d be better off looking at support-neutral wins, which is something different.
Give you an example, Laffey coughed up eight runs in a game, twice this season, and yet ended up with a pretty good ERA. You’d rather have that guy than a guy who spread those 16 runs out over more games.
Sure, but again, we’re trying to compare starters in general to closers in general, so measures that help you distinguish between good and bad starters or good and bad relievers aren’t necessarily what we’re looking for.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 1:28 PM EST up reply actions
I’m just guessing that in retrospect, Cleveland’s “underperformance” of its pyth (which seems to constantly be blamed on Wedge) can be attributed to the volatile bullpen. That doesn’t take into account the fact that a great starting pitching staff reduces the workload on the bullpen, and perhaps makes them more effective (or just less exposed?).
I think a reliable closer helps avoid chain-reaction pitiful bullpen performance. And by reliable, I’m going to side with Jay on this one and say “consistent.” Such a closer won’t often turn one run leads into one run losses. And it leads to more wins. It’s just that saving those ten or fifteen late inning runs each year can lead to four or six more wins just by the nature of when those runs are scored, and that extra four to six game cushion can make the difference year in and year out.
Yeah, I get what you’re saying, and I share your intuition that a consistent bullpen (in particular, having your 2 or 3 best relievers be consistent) should be a good way to avoid Pythagorean underperformance, particularly by avoiding cases where you give up walkoff wins. These are the cases where if the inning finished, you might end up giving a few more runs, and thereby decreasing your Pythag to be more in line with your wins, but since the game stops when the home team gets the lead, you wind up with a loss and an inflated Pythag — in the end, “underperforming your Pythag” might be a misleading way to put it, since I suspect it’s probably more like “your Pythag overperforming what it should be”. This is related to Jay’s point above about a deep bullpen leading to Pythagorean underperformance — again, you’re saving runs in fairly meaningless situations, and so your Pythag is inflated by the good performance of those depth relievers.
But I think my central point is this: It is easy to identify the late game situations where the W/L outcome hinges on a reliever either saving a game or not. We tend to pay less focused attention to situations where the starter gives up runs or not sometime in the middle of the game, causing a difference down the line between, say, a 1-run lead and a 1-run deficit, or between a 3-run lead and a 1-run lead, or even between a 5-run lead and a 3-run lead. You can say that having a guy who saves 1-run leads is super-valuable — and it is — but it is at least as valuable to have a starter who put you in position to have 3-run leads rather than 1-run leads in the 9th, or gives you a 1-run lead rather than a 1-run deficit. It’s more difficult to assign causal responsibility when there’s intervening stuff than when there isn’t, but that doesn’t change the fact that if you add or subtract any two runs, you can change the outcome of a 1-run game.
Now, since a starter is out there for a lot more innings than a closer, a given performance differential should change a lot more 3-run leads to 1-run leads for a starter than it will change blown 1-run save opportunities to converted opportunities for a closer.
And yeah, I know I’m glossing over a lot of psychology here, but I suspect that whatever psychological leverage-related factors there are (even if they all line up to favor the closer, which is no guarantee), they’re swamped by the magnitude of the innings differential.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 26, 2008 7:14 PM EST up reply actions
I don’t think you’re off the mark at all. I’ve always said, and it’s well documented in my posting history here, that I absolutely abhor the idea that an early run is less detrimental than a late run and, analogously, that wins/losses in the early months shouldn’t be desired like they are in a pennant race. Every game you win in April and May is one less win you have to win in September to reach the 92-94 wins it takes to win a division in any given year. Win enough games in the first half, and you even get the other teams to start doing crazy things, like selling off their assets and re-focusing for next year.
And I think that same logic applies in the context of every single baseball game. Get an early lead, build up some runs, you’re less likely to see the opposing team’s top relievers, and you’re then likely to score more runs yourself.
I’m not advocating having a stellar closer over a stellar starter. Far from it. Give me the superior starting pitcher every day of the week. But what I’m advocating is a superior closer over the Joe Borowski closer. I believe it address a whole different point (maybe two points).
1) The bullpen has really killed the Indians in two of the last four seasons, though there certainly were other issues with those teams.
2) If the Indians get to the playoffs, they need the shutdown back end consisting of more than one guy.. Raffy Perez is one. That’s where the questions begin. A healthy Adam Miller might be another. Hell, Meloan might be one too. Jensen Lewis could be, but he’s mostly a fastball guy a la David Riske.
I think the Indians feel the same way, and that’s why they were willing to go all in on Trevor Hoffman a few years back. Last year, that target just wasn’t available on the free agent market. This year, I expect to see another offer to a free agent closer that will make most of us say, “Wow, do you really want to spend THAT much on one guy who throws 65 innings?”.
Hmm… I may have misunderstood what you were suggesting.
I agree with everything you’ve said here… And in reality, although I would prefer we get a solid starter to getting a closer, there might not be many starters worth pursuing that fall in our price range, whereas it appears to be a relative buyer’s market for closers this year. And I feel fairly good about Laffey and Reyes, so if we aren’t able to sign or trade for a starter, hopefully Sowers/Jackson/Lewis will do a reasonable job of not sucking in the fifth spot until Huff is ready to come up…
by Logodaedalus on Nov 27, 2008 12:15 PM EST up reply actions
Amplifying your point, people often talk about the ripple effect of adding a good hitter to the lineup, in terms of depth, roleplaying and protection. These concepts are only sporadically valid for adding a hitter, but they are all pretty significant when you add a highly effective reliever.
Think about that 2007 bullpen with more more effective reliever. Now think about that same bullpen with one fewer effective reliever. Huge differences.
young unproven starter
Don’t we already have enough of those?
The best thing probably is to hit [Grady] 2nd -- Jay
by Buckeye Brad on Nov 25, 2008 7:29 AM EST up reply actions
How about trading for a young unproven starter with a decent amount of upside? We don’t have many of those.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 10:17 AM EST up reply actions
OK, but how many teams want to trade a young starter with upside?
The best thing probably is to hit [Grady] 2nd -- Jay
by Buckeye Brad on Nov 25, 2008 10:38 AM EST up reply actions
If we traded for Andy Sonnanstine I would forgot about Mark Ellis in an INSTANT. We need an SS Sonnanstine right now.
I’m drooling.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 11:30 AM EST up reply actions
I like all three. But none have #2 starter upside. The only one who could come close is probably Huff.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 11:32 AM EST up reply actions
I don’t understand this #2, #3, etc, etc arguments. Those numbers are based on a players record of performance. There are a variety of different ways to be great performers. Scott Lewis, for example, isn’t someone I’m super high on. But it is hard to argue with his performance record, even as he has advanced.
I commonly use the #2 (or whatever) as an easy way to approximate performance. For example, I don’t think that just because someone is the second best starter on the team they are a #2. I mean a #2 as the level below the CC Sabathias of the world.
I’m all for statistical analysis, but Scott Lewis is the perfect example of why stats alone aren’t good enough. Lewis is probably better than scouts give him credit for, but the fact remains that he’s a fly ball pitcher without good stuff. He could be a decent back-of-the-rotation starter, but from what I know that’s pretty much his ceiling.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 11:49 AM EST up reply actions
I agree with the general view of Scott Lewis, but some point you have to acknowledge what they actually do on the mound. Paul Byrd somehow manages to get guys out at the big league level and has for quite some time. He’s not, and probably never really has been, a #2 starter….but he’s gotten it done with fly ball tendencies, weak stuff, and great control. The same combination Lewis has. Not saying Lewis is going to put together a long career, but performance trumps both past numbers and scouting reports.
I’m usually the one making that argument :).
I agree – Lewis could be a major league starter. That’s a damn good pitcher. Nothing wrong with being a solid #4/5. I just don’t think he can be more than that.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:17 PM EST up reply actions
I feel like the discussion is lacking some real-world context … again … of what a real #2 pitcher is.
The THT series basically showed that an average pitching staff’s second-best starter has around a 4.20 ERA, and the best 15 pitching staffs had a second-best starter with around a 3.85 ERA.
Peter, are you really saying that Laffey’s upside isn’t in that range? He’s been very close to that range for his first 25 starts.
I commonly use the #2 (or whatever) as an easy way to approximate performance. For example, I don’t think that just because someone is the second best starter on the team they are a #2. I mean a #2 as the level below the CC Sabathias of the world.
I do not think there are 30 #1 starters in baseball. And there are certainly more than 30 #5 starters.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:11 PM EST up reply actions
Well, that sub-CC standard is ridiculous. Over the past three seasons, CC is one of the top five pitchers is baseball. I can get behind the idea that there are fewer than 30 “#1 starters,” but the idea that there’s only five or six just renders the concept meaningless.
Come on, you’re nit-picking and you know it. CC Sabathia is a #1 starter. There are some pitchers who aren’t quite as good as Sabathia that are also #1 starters. But when, for example, BA or Kevin Goldstein writes that a pitcher has “#1 starter potential,” they don’t mean a 3.60 ERA. I base of my jargon off of what people like them use.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:16 PM EST up reply actions
I think this point needs a little more beating down, er, I mean, clarifying.
First, I’d like to see some kind of actual citation as to how the lingo is used. My guess is that your usage mirrors part and maybe even all of the industry, but I would also guess that there’s wide variation in how it’s used. As an aside, one thing I can tell you about the Indians is that Shapiro made a big push when he took over to standardize the nomenclature and terminology used by all scouting and development personnel, so that the same pitches or concepts or tools would be called the same thing by everybody. If they even use “#2 starter” as a term internally, it may not mean the same thing as it does elsewhere in the league.
Second, I think quite a few guys are sensible enough to appreciate that a 3.60 ERA (in many league contexts) is a #1 starter. Roy Halladay has a career ERA of 3.52, and if he’s not a #1 starter, then this whole conversation is officially retarded. As in: “That guy simply doesn’t have #1 starter potential, he’ll probably end up no better than Roy Halladay.”
Third, those who use the lingo as you do — and I think Baseball America basically does — also have an appropriate, matching appreciation for the value of a #2 or #3 or even #4 starter, as you/they are defining them. So a newbie might be reading BA and thinking to himself, “Why does everyone think drafting Jeremy Sowers makes sense at #6 overall, when they say he’s only a #2 starter?” And the reason is: When they say #2 starter, they’re saying perhaps Top 40 starter, and that’s a hell of a valuable thing.
As to that third point, I don’t know if you’re failing to appreciate those guys appropriately or if others here are just assuming that you don’t because they misconstrue your labeling, and I think it would be helpful for you to clarify that.
Back to the specific pitchers, I think Laffey certainly has a #2 ceiling (your lingo), based on what he was able to achieve at every level, very young, and how quickly he’s adjusted to each level, again very young. He’s already been league-average across 25 major league starts, age 22-23, and I have little reason to think he can’t learn and adjust just a little more and emerge as a Top 40 starter. Not that he will necessarily, mind you, just that he reasonably might.
As for Huff, he’s just had his first healthy season as a professional, and the results were basically stellar. He’s not young, but his MLEs indicate he was already pitching at the level of the 40th best qualifying starter over the past season. It would be wrong to predict he’ll improve further, but it would also be wrong to assume that he couldn’t.
I basically agree with 95% of what you wrote. The nomenclature itself has no value judgment – my way of defining “third starter” isn’t any better or worse than the Hardball Times article’s, or anyone else’s. I simply try to repeat what I hear/read from sources I respect.
As to that third point, I don’t know if you’re failing to appreciate those guys appropriately or if others here are just assuming that you don’t because they misconstrue your labeling, and I think it would be helpful for you to clarify that.
Number one starters, in my understanding, are extremely rare. Number two starters are also difficult to find. Heck, even fifth starters aren’t easy to find – pitching is difficult.
My understanding of the lingo is that someone like Jake Westbrook is a #3 starter. Westbrook is basically 10-15% above average, and signed a 3 year extension worth $36 million – a move that was both universally regarded as below-market as well as universally praised. That’s an indication of just how valuable a “#3” is.
I think Laffey certainly has a #2 ceiling (your lingo), based on what he was able to achieve at every level, very young, and how quickly he’s adjusted to each level, again very young. He’s already been league-average across 25 major league starts, age 22-23, and I have little reason to think he can’t learn and adjust just a little more and emerge as a Top 40 starter.
I disagree with this. And I am a Laffey apologist. Unless Laffey makes some significant improvements, I don’t think he can be any better than Jake Westbrook. His stuff certainly isn’t as good as Westbrook’s, and his strikeout rate in the minors wasn’t very high – it was certainly good enough, considering his walk rate and groundballing tendencies, but it also wasn’t that high.
Here are some fellow ground ball pitchers who I believe fall approximately into the “roles” as defined by the lingo.
- - Brandon Webb: ~7.5 K per game, ~2.5 walks per game, ~65% GB
- - Derek Lowe (circa 07 and 08): ~6.5 K, ~2.5 BB, ~65% GB
- - Jake Westbrook (circa 03-06): ~5 K, ~2.5 BB, ~62% GB
- - Aaron Cook: ~4 K, ~2.3 BB, ~60% GB
Ground ball pitchers can survive – and even be pretty good – with low K rates, if they can also limit their walks. The ground ball pitchers who have decent K rates can be above-average pitchers; ground ball pitchers with solid strikeout rates are aces.
In 2007, Laffey struck out 4.7 per game, walked 2.2, and got grounders 62% of the time. In order to enter the echelon of “#2 starter”, I think he’d have to add about two strikeouts per game to his numbers, without raising his walks or losing any grounders. Is it possible? Certainly. It’s just not likely. The guy throws 88 MPH, lacks a killer offspeed pitch, and struck out 6.02 batters per nine in the minors. He’d need to IMPROVE, rather than simply develop, in order to reach those strikeout numbers.
Of course, that being said, Laffey looks like a low-risk bet to become something very similar to Jake Westbrook. And as we’ve established, that has a lot of value.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 29, 2008 12:03 AM EST up reply actions
I would just counter by saying that I think Laffey is capable, at his best, of putting up those Derek Lowe type numbers. Echoing Jay, one of Laffey’s most impressive qualities is not only that he came through the system so young, but that his numbers got better the higher he went and he showed the ability to adjust as he went. You can just look at his K/9 numbers as he went from Lake County (4.4) to Kinston (5.2) to Akron (4.9), to a repeat of Akron (6.1) to Buffalo (7.0 and 6.9). All while maintaining >60% GB rates and keeping his BB/9 under 2.5. He hasn’t been able to get his K numbers up yet in the majors, but I think there is reason to be optimistic that he will at some point.
For me, Laffey is an interesting prospect because he is one of the few I can think of who continually exceeded expectations and therefore raised the view of his ceiling. Laffey’s 2007 was a major breakout season.
I hope you’re right. But I maintain that in order to become a left-handed Derek Lowe (the 07 and 08 version), Laffey will need to continue to exceed expectations and over-perform his track record at the major league level – he’ll need to significantly improve on his “breakout” 2007 (I agree, it was a breakout, but his numbers were somewhere between Aaron Cook and Jake Westbrook).
If you’re going to cite his improvement at various stops in the minors – which I think is a completely valid and important point – then you also need to cite the fact that his GB rate fell about 10% in 2008. In both the majors and the minors. I think/hope this was due to mechanical problems and/or an injury, either/both of which are hopefully fixed, but this is still worth noting: he took a big step backwards in 2008.
I just don’t think you can look at Laffey’s stuff and track record and think that he can become a #2. Sure, it’s possible, but it’d be quite a feat and is extremely unlikely. It’s a lot more reasonable to say that his ceiling is a #3, a la Jake Westbrook.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 29, 2008 12:12 PM EST up reply actions
I’m suspicious/worried Laffey was injured last season or setting himself up for a more major injury. His velocity dropped and if I could track down his 2007 pitch f/x numbers (for some reason I can only find his 2008 numbers) I bet you’d see he lost movement on his sinker. Hopefully rest during the off-season gets him back to where he needs to be.
I think you are vastly overplaying your hand on this.
Unlikely is not extremely unlikely. It’s just plain old unlikely. He’s shown excellent control and groundball tendencies at a very young age, and he’s already been an average major-league starter in his first 25 starts at age 22-23. It is not extremely unlikely that he will progress from the #3 starter caliber he has already demonstrated merely to #2 caliber.
For that matter, you’ve started misusing the word “ceiling.” Ceiling does not refer to what is probable, it refers to what is reasonably possible. You are not giving our pitchers reasonable credit for what is reasonably possible for them to achieve.
Nothing suggests that he has enough stuff to add two strikeouts per game to his record. You’re right that it’s not extremely unlikely, so I suppose you could argue that this is his “ultimate ceiling.” I guess I don’t think reasonably think that he can add those strikeouts – judging by his velocity, stuff, and minor league track record.
It’s not horribly unreasonable that he adds the necessary strikeouts. But I don’t think it’s particularly reasonable, either.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 30, 2008 3:25 PM EST up reply actions
i can chime in here. as an architect, i can tell you that there is no such thing as an ultimate ceiling. maybe you should call it laffy’s “bottom of structure above”.
by Brick. on Nov 30, 2008 9:57 PM EST up reply actions 1 recs
Again, you’re conflating “can” and “will.”
I will conceded that it’s not likely, but given the way he’s adjusted and improved at every level, and his rather limited major league experience, there certainly is a reasonable chance. We frankly just don’t have a bead on his limitations yet, and if you think you do, you’re just kidding yourself. Apparently you forget all about small samples when it comes to capping the ceiling of a groundball pitcher.
The target, if he becomes available, should be Zack Greinke. The Royals are reportedly trying to sign him to an extension. It remains to be seen if he’ll commit there. I know the Royals just signed Olivo for a year, but if I’m the GM, Kelly Shoppach is well on his way to KC if the Royals have interest in him.
One would think the Royals would be mining talent with little or no service time, but their additions of Crisp and Jacobs insist they really want to try and win 80 games this year.
I don’t think the Royals would have interest in Mills with the logjam they have at the corners. I think they’d prefer outfield talent and catching, plus a starter. The Indians can meet that demand.
Crisp, Teahen, DeJesus, Guillen…why are the Royals looking for outfield talent (aside from the obvious – that those guys aren’t really that good)?
Teams would line up around the block to trade for Greinke.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 11:31 AM EST up reply actions
Not that the Royals would deal with the Indians, but the Indians have as much talent at or on the cusp of the MLB level than any team. And Teahen will probably be gone soon. And with Butler, Sheely, and Kila Ka-aihue at 1B, you would have thought the Royals were set at first base.
I disagree about the Indians having as much near-ready talent as any team. Well, they might have a lot of guys who are ready to play in the majors, but those guys probably won’t have too much value.
As much as we’d love to think the opposite, Crowe, Francisco, Sowers, Jackson, Garko, Lewis, Laffey, Sowers, Reyes simply don’t have much trade value, at all.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:00 PM EST up reply actions
Just like Luke Scott, Jeremy Guthrie, Brandon Phillips, and Maicer Izturis had no value? I’m under no false pretense that the Indians can package three or four of their spare parts to get a star return. But it’s incorrect to assume those guys don’t have some value to both the Indians or to other teams.
I don’t understand the comparison. We DFAed Guthrie and Phillips, so yes, they had no value.
We traded Izturis along with Ryan Church for Scott Stewart.
IIRC, we traded Luke Scott AND Willy Taveras for…was it Jeriome Robertson?
I think you just made my point for me: the guys you listed had very, very little value.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:20 PM EST up reply actions
Shapiro has since admitted that the Indians undervalued those guys. AND, again, look at context. Those players being out of options or needing to be added to the 40-man roster really altered their value.
He may have admitted to undervaluing certain players in terms of their ability to contribute, but he did not undervalue Phillips’ trade value — I’m sure he took the best bid that was out there, and that by definition was the player’s trade value. Gotta agree with Peter on this.
I think I meant undervalued as a whole, not just in his trade value. I don’t doubt he took the best player, but I think it’s obvious (I’m not beating this horse) that the Indians undervalued Phillips.
Is Shoppach’s trade value, at least to the Indians, not colored by his value to themselves if they were to keep him? In other words, is trade value not intertwined with availability?
Shoppach means less to the Indians when they have Victor Martinez; I think he means more to the Royals because they have…Miguel Olivo?
Phillips’ value was colored by the fact that the Indians had Belliard. Or maybe it was just Phillips’ availability (and not his value) that was impacted.
This is semantics. Phillips had no trade value regardless of whether we wanted to trade him. What you’re talking about is how we decide whether to trade him, comparing his trade value to his internal value. If you’re going to say that internal value is part of trade value, then you’re just asking for a very confusing discussion.
I can’t help but gleam Laffey away from that list. He’s entering his age 24 season, hit the majors at 22, is a plus 50% GB pitcher, with good to excellent BB/9 rates in the majors and excellent in the minors (against older competion mostly) and is lefty. Oh and service time has him years before arbitration.
What I was driving at is that Greinke is going to take a package of the best we can offer.
Steel Nick
I agree. Not quite a Dan Haren package, but it’d take two or three decent prospects. But if a MLB piece like Shoppach is involved, you don’t have to send much else, if anything.
Agreed. Greinke is one of the most valuable properties in baseball.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 11:58 AM EST up reply actions
That’s not even CLOSE to being true.
Not close at all.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:00 PM EST up reply actions
I know this discussion has occurred elsewhere, but I think other teams are (rightly) skeptical of Shoppach.
Yes, he’s good. But…he struck out at third highest rate of any player in baseball. The power is real, but BABIP was abnormally high this year (.359 – that’s 19th highest of any player with at least 200 plate appearances). If his batting average falls from .260 to .220 or .230, he’s barely an adequate starting catcher.
And he’s not that young, nor is he that cheap. Yes, because of the dearth of catchers, he has value. But he’s from being one of the top properties in baseball. Very, very far.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:12 PM EST up reply actions
Teams certainly should be skeptical of Shoppach, but he did this year what his minor league numbers always suggested he would. He’ll hit .250, hit a bunch of homeruns, draw some walks, lean into some pitches, and strike out a bunch. That skill set will make him a desirable commodity if the Indians make him available.
Look at what the Indians got for Casey Blake. Established talent at the MLB level has a price tag. I would suggest that Indians fans let their skepticism of Shoppach lead to undervaluing him.
Greinke is an immense talent. One of the most intriguing in the game. But he’s only two years from free agency. He’s been productive in spurts. He’s had some off-field issues that don’t necessarily detract from his on-field value. The Royals will get a nice return. But if it’s just prospects, it won’t be six prospects. And if it’s going to include MLB talent, they’ll get significantly less bodies.
First of all, the Blake trade is not a fair comparison, for two reasons: 1) most GMs aren’t Ned Colletti, and 2) Ned Colletti undervalues prospects and has shown that he isn’t too bright. Also, he was trying to save his job and was under orders not to take on any cash. That was a steal and is unlikely to happen again.
Shoppach definitely has value, I’m not denying that. But he over-performed this year, he’s not particularly young, and he’s already arbitration eligible. That has value, but is FAR from one of the most valuable properties in baseball. VERY far.
And I really think you’re undervaluing Greinke.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:24 PM EST up reply actions
Yeah, because Dayton Moore is a great GM thus far.
It doesn’t make sense to throw out deals because “the GM is dumb.” There are enough dumb GMs every year that these deals are part of the sample.
I don’t know, I tend to think opportunities like this are pretty rare. Expos in 2002 was a special situation, as were the Dodgers in 2008, as was Bavasi in 2006. The good news is that we have a front office that recognizes a moment like this and jumps all over it, but they don’t come around all the time, just once every couple of years, and they probably will get more scarce.
I’m not undervaluing Greinke. I think he’d be the best starting in the Indians’ 2009 rotation, with all due respect to Cliff Lee. Maybe I’m just overvaluing Shoppach.
As for all GM’s not being Ned Colletti, I’d like to point out that Dayton Moore just acquired Mike Jacobs.
Greinke would almost certainly be the best pitcher in the Indians rotation. I don’t think Shoppach is even good enough to be the centerpiece of a 3- or 4-player trade to get Greinke, however.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:30 PM EST up reply actions
Then, my friend, we’re never going to get on the same page. And that’s ok. That’s how different teams value players differently.
For our sake, I definitely hope you’re right. All it takes is one team to value Shoppach the way you do… :)
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:35 PM EST up reply actions
I think you’re vastly overstating the suspicion of Shoppach’s numbers.
Yes, BABIP. But he also led the league in Isolated Power after June 1, when he essentially became the starter.
Not a lot of BS in that number. Any catcher with premium defensive skills who can lead the league in ISO, even for only four months, would not be considered much of a risk for being a below-average contributor. And at catcher, even an average contributor is of significant value.
I basically agree with this. Although I’m sure you’d admit the caveat of small sample size of four months of a season for a guy who’s already 28.
You also can’t dismiss the BABIP when the guy posted a .261 BA and .348 OBP with a very-inflated BABIP. When that BABIP regresses, the BA and OBP could fall 30-40 points. And there’s a big difference between a .261/.348/.517 line and a .231/.318/.460 line.
I agree that the latter has value, absolutely. Just not Greinke-level value.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:37 PM EST up reply actions
I disagree. The lesser of the two lines is still a 102 OPS+ (based on Shoppach’s specific park-adjusted league averages, per B-R), which is outstanding for a catcher with strong defensive skills.
28 is not young but also not old, particularly for a guy who’s been a backup for most of the last three seasons. He’s not developing but shouldn’t be declining either.
I don’t dismiss the BIP correction at all, but it clearly is not the whole story, that’s all I was saying. If his BABIP was the only outstanding thing about his numbers, that would be deeply suspicious — but it’s not. His ISO is even more outrageous than his BABIP, and that is a very good thing.
It sounds like you and I value Shoppach in a similar manner. I agree that the ISO is probably more or less real, and it thus makes him an average-ish catcher (perhaps slightly above, perhaps slightly below).
Even with the relative scarcity of the catching market, I still don’t think this is even close to the value of Greinke.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 26, 2008 10:05 PM EST up reply actions
Haven’t really thought it through, to be honest, but it does seem to me that the contract situation is a significant equalizer. Greinke will get at least $15 million in arbitration over the next two years if not $20 million. Shoppach is under contract for one additional season — essentially, he still has his first arbitration year and Greinke doesn’t — and he’ll be very cheap for that extra year. Even after that, he’s going to get a lot less than Greinke for his last two seasons — unless he’s has a massive All-Star season in 2009, which would be a net positive outcome anyway.
He’s young and talented, but he’s also only two years from free agency. Shoppach is three, and plays a prime position. I can’t remember whether it was ESPN or TSN or another, but they examined the true talent that has been dealt for top tier players. The conclusion was that it’s not the bounty haul you would think.
Haren was a 6 player deal, but he was signed for cheap, had three straight years of workhorse effectiveness, AND was three years from free agency.
The Diamondbacks gave up:
Greg Smith and Dana Eveland, two ML-ready pitchers who lack upside but were slightly-below average right away.
Chris Carter, who hit 39 homers at age 21 in high-A, with a .930 OPS.
Aaron Cunningham, an outfielder who plays above-average defense, had an 893 OPS in double-A, 1106 OPS in triple-A, and reached the majors, at age 22.
Carlos Gonzalez, a toolsy outfielder who was the centerpiece of the Matt Holliday trade.
Haren is more valuable than Greinke, I agree. But the haul for Haren was HUGE, and it’d only be slightly smaller for Greinke.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:07 PM EST up reply actions
Ok…so if the Diamonbacks were to hypothetically acquire Shoppach last offseason, how many of those players would the Indians have hauled in?
Total guess: we wouldn’t have gotten more than one of three good prospects (Carter, Cunningham, Gonzalez). Maybe one of the mediocre pitchers too.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:21 PM EST up reply actions
Trade value is about perception. And maybe you’re correct in guessing what package the Indians can secure for Shoppach. But I’d like to think that teams are willing to value players on more than just perception. For example…Boston trades a gold glove caliber CF with a passable bat (as long as he’s playing CF) in exchange for….a middle reliever. Hrm…
I don’t understand what you’re saying about the Red Sox/Royals deal.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:25 PM EST up reply actions
That trades are about perception. And you don’t know how teams are valuing their players and players on other clubs. The Red Sox used their bullet on a middle reliever because they felt they could more easily find another outfielder in this market, and that it’d be impossible to find a decent right-handed reliever.
The world universally holds Greinke as a top tier talent but thinks Shoppach strikes out too much. But we don’t know how the Royals or any other teams values their catching situation.
FWIW, I thought Crisp for RamRam was a perfectly fair trade.
I thought it was silly for the Royals to want someone like Crisp, but other than that it was equal in value.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:32 PM EST up reply actions
I’m confused why you don’t think our young pitchers have upside. Huff, Laffey and Reyes all seem like good “upside” bets. Sowers, ZachAttack and Slewi maybe less so, but they aren’t exactly Scott Elarton v3.0
Well, what do you mean by “upside”?
I’m using it to distinguish guys that can be anywhere from 10% below league average to 10% above (give or take). I consider “upside” to be guys who have a reasonable chance of being 15-25% above league average.
Practically speaking, the AL league ERA was 4.44 this year. So, to me, “upside” constitutes a pitcher who’s true ability would lend itself to an ERA (ERA is misleading, but I’ll use it for the sake of argument) of ~3.80 or lower in that offensive environment.
I see Huff as being capable of exceeding this. Laffey could probably approach 10% better than league average (4.00 ERA). Same with Reyes – capable of approaching that 110 ERA+, but not much better.
Sowers and Jackson haven’t shown much to suggest that they can even be league average. I suppose they could be, but that seems like their ceiling unless they show significant improvement. Lewis may be able to be a little better than league average, but that’s probably pushing it.
Point is: by this definiton of “upside” (and I am NOT saying that this is necessarily the best/only definition, but this is a rough estimate of how I use "upside), these players lack upside. That doesn’t mean they can’t be useful, but I do think we could use another young player with more upside than these guys (perhaps saving Huff).
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 11:58 AM EST up reply actions
I don’t find this whole discussion very compelling at all but I think what others (and more or less myself) are taking umbrage with is that you seem to just be saying “These guys lack upside” and, here, defining upside.
With Huff especially, it makes no sense to me to listen to you saying he might be a No. 3 or could really overachieve and be a No. 2 when I can just look at his numbers and say “I see no reason to believe this guy doesn’t have as good a shot as just about anybody at being an excellent No. 2.”
Same thing with Laffey.
My statement is my interpretation of the numbers and what I know of his stuff.
Huff’s absolute ceiling is a #2, IMO (in other words, he develops to his absolute full potential).
And Laffey is not nearly as good as Huff.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:26 PM EST up reply actions
I think you’re being much to hard on both of them, especially as compared to the prospects in other systems.
Are they likely No. 2’s? Eh. Who is? But they both do enough things very, very well that it’s not unlikely. If those two guys don’t have “upside” then there aren’t more than a handful of unproven pitchers near the ML level who do.
What do you see in Laffey that suggests that his ceiling is anything beyond Jake Westbrook-at-best?
Upside is the potential to be well-above-average. That’s how the term is used. Laffey doesn’t really have the potential to be well-above-average. Huff does, but not nearly as much as a LOT of pitching prospects. He just happens to have the most upside of the group of minor league pitching we have above A ball.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:35 PM EST up reply actions
That’s not an argument for someone’s ceiling. You can’t base anything on one month’s worth of numbers alone.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 12:51 PM EST up reply actions
Laffey has a top ten in the majors GB% and won’t be 24 until April. Laffey’s potential is Jake Westbrook-at-his-best. Which is well above average. He’s got to improve at other things but so does nearly every other 24 year old pitcher.
Huff does everything extremely well. I know the other best pitching prospects in baseball and I don’t think more than 15-20 of them are substantially better than Huff; I think he’s being wildly underrated by most of the prospect-heads because of a lack of excitement over his stuff. You don’t think this guy is better than Luke Hochevar? I’m not even sure Wade Davis is any better than Huff.
This is such a weird conversation for me to have. I’m usually the one arguing your points – for both Laffey and Huff. So please keep that in mind: I like both of these guys, a lot.
That being said, Laffey’s ceiling seems like it’s Jake Westbrook. And there’s nothing wrong with that – from 2003 to 2007, Westbrook’s average ERA+ was 108 (which is exactly what I said I thought Laffey’s ceiling would be: approximately 10% better than league average). Laffey doesn’t get many strikeouts but gets tons of grounders and limits walks, making him…Jake Westbrook.
Of course, Laffey’s GB rates fell significantly this year – he got grounders on 51.2% of his balls in play in the majors and only 53.2% in Buffalo. Hopefully this is a fluke and/or can be corrected.
Huff definitely is underrated. I actually just wrote about him yesterday over at fangraphs. His stuff is unexciting but MUCH better than Laffey’s, and he’s above-average at three important things: strikeouts, walks, and ground balls. He’s not amazing in any, but being average-or-better in all three makes you a heck of pitcher.
However, to be a #2 (in my eyes), Huff would need to maintain his fantastic walk rate and get a lot of strikeouts and grounders. It’s possible, but it’s also his absolute best-case-scenario ceiling. Wade Davis may not have had a better career than Huff when all is said and done, but Davis has the reasonable possibility of being a better pitcher. In other words, if things go perfectly for both Huff and Davis, Davis will be better.
Luke Hochevar sucks.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:09 PM EST up reply actions
But, as Jay just posted above, that’s not what a #2 is. A number 2 is about a 4.20.
And 51% of outs on GBs is still good for top 10 in the majors!
I just don’t like the idea of penalizing Huff for what he’s already doing and has to keep doing (not walking anybody) and giving credit to Davis for what he isn’t doing but people perceive as easier (drastically reducing his walk rate). Until Huff shows he can’t do what he needs to or Davis shows he can do what he needs to, I’m going to give credit to the one who’s actually doing what he has to: Huff.
No, that’s not what a #2 starter is. That’s not how the lingo is used.
There’s a huge difference between grounders on 50% of your BIP and grounders on 60% – especially for guys like Laffey who will never strike many batters out.
And it’s not CREDIT, it’s POSSIBILITY. Davis has the possibility of reaching a higher ceiling than Huff – even though the probability of Davis reaching his ceiling is much lower than Huff.
Given the choice between Huff and Davis, it’s not an easy decision. But it seems clear that Davis’s CEILING – his UPSIDE – is higher.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:20 PM EST up reply actions
Merely to distinguish. I didn’t mean to come across as vehement or frustrated, and I’m sorry if I did. The caps were used for emphasis.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:29 PM EST up reply actions
There are two fundamental things here:
1-I don’t buy this business of using “jargon” to define #1/#2 starters. It makes no sense to define 80% of all major league pitchers as 4/5s. What’s the use of that? How does that apply to putting together a rotation?
When I’m thinking of a #2, I’m thinking would this guy be about as good as most other team’s #2? I don’t see how anything else makes sense.
2-I think the Indians are valuing Huff and Laffey highly, Huff like a top 15 pitching prospect and Laffey like a top 40, and I think their right. These two guys represent a market inefficiency that the Indians have spent a few years trying to figure out-guys without big K’s and without necessarily big stuff that are still very good. I’m pseudo-confident that this is the year that they translate this inefficiency into a marked advantage on the field.
I don’t even think they’d want Davis or Homer Bailey for Huff and I think they’re right.
The inefficiency was/still is ground ball pitchers. Not “guys who don’t have good stuff.” Just understanding that there’s more than one way to skin a cat. And ground balls are cheaper to obtain than strikeouts.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:44 PM EST up reply actions
You can disagree with the jargon. That’s fine, and I understand. But I use the jargon the way I do because that’s what people on the “inside” tend to use.
No, it doesn’t mean one is right and is another is wrong. But I learn the idea of a #1 starter from Keith Law and Kevin Goldstein. Who learn it from guys who, ya know, work for baseball teams.
The Indians value Huff and Laffey so highly because they are good and they are cost-controlled. They are absolutely right do value them highly. Let me repeat: there is nothing wrong with being a #3/4 starter. That’s tremendously valuable (especially for pre-arb players) and those guys don’t grow on trees.
You are probably right that the Indians wouldn’t trade Huff for Bailey (and they may hesitate to deal Huff for Davis, although they’d probably consider it). But that’s not what we’re talking about – we were talking about the issue of ceiling. And both Davis and Bailey have a higher ceiling than Huff.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:42 PM EST up reply actions
I don’t care if anyone on the inside uses it, it’s dumb. You make fun of Ned Colletti up there and you are using a term that I’m sure he employs liberally.
Somehow I doubt Shap and Anonetti refer to pitchers using this system with any seriousness.
As far as I know, that’s simply inaccurate. The scouting lingo for #1 starter is not 3.60 ERA. The scouting lingo for #2 starter is not 4.15. That’s just not how the lingo is used.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:46 PM EST up reply actions
No one who is serious about this is going to use this lingo in any serious way. It makes for good copy on BA or whatever but it’s useless when you have to actually compare players and make decisions.
Because when you use it, you have a bunch of people spending 15,000 words arguing over what defines a number 2. Like here.
If that’s your argument, we’re going to have to agree to disagree.
BA has a lot of faults, but one of their strengths is that they basically get everything they have from scouts. That can mean over-hyping some players and not valuing statistics…but it also means that you get correct terminology/jargon.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:56 PM EST up reply actions
If it’s generally understood by those who use it, it’s advantageous.
Even if other terminology is better, if it confuses people it’s worse.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 2:03 PM EST up reply actions
But it’s the scout’s definition that is fundamentally different than the way baseball is normally talked about.
Every team has a number one starter-someone who is the number one spot in the rotation. Yet, according to this definition, about 15-20 teams have someone who is not a number one as their number one starter.
Yet, we would still refer to that person as “The Pirate’s Number 1 starter.”
Alright, I’m tapping out.
language can be used to obfuscate just as easily as it can be used to reveal.
and thats true even of people who think they’re revealing things with their language.
Anti-Ben Fran before it was cool.
by Gradyforpresident on Nov 25, 2008 2:22 PM EST up reply actions
I don’t mean to argue that the “scouting lingo” is better or worse than other lingo.
Just that it exists, and it is used in a certain way.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 2:24 PM EST up reply actions
I drove by a pizza place yesterday with a marquee that said “Obfuscate Now”. And that’s all.
It was awesome.
by Logodaedalus on Nov 25, 2008 2:30 PM EST up reply actions
The point I was making, the point of the THT articles I linked, was that the lingo is vague and totally unhelpful, in that it doesn’t reflect the reality of major league expectations, norms and needs.
In other words, you say, his upside is #2 starter, using the lingo. In reality, you’re saying he’ll be a fringe #1 starter, just not an ace.
Okay, but where does he fit in the pair-of-aces-for-the-postseason strategy?
by fleerdon on Nov 25, 2008 1:38 PM EST up reply actions
Haven’t you heard? The best postseason strategy is “three good pitchers.”
We’ve got two, and we’re hoping one of these other eight guys can be the third.
Actually, it’s “three good starters.”
And “three relievers who are shovel-to-the-face dominating” also helps.
by Jay on Nov 25, 2008 1:40 PM EST up reply actions 1 recs
No, Hall of Famers are not required. Sabathia-Carmona-Westbrook was a good example of this, except that Carmona was way better than required for this premise.
Actually, my point was that no team ever put three topnotch starters into the postseason for more consecutive years than Atlanta. No need to explain exactly how many times they went all the way.
I don’t think there is a post-season team building strategy.
Absolutely. But the post season would still have been a crapshoot. I think the only post-season strategy is to get there.
Intuitively, the Braves seem like they should have been a post-season juggernaut. The record says something else, and also shows teams with spotty rotations (2006 Cardinals, 2008 Phillies) winning the WS.
Bill James did a thing in an early abstract in which he looked for factors that would predict post-season short series success. As I recall, the only team stat that was associated with a significant difference was batting average. And that was inverse – lower BA teams won more series.
Maybe someone has updated this for the post-1995 world.
Being good at coin flips would be helpful….
by Logodaedalus on Nov 26, 2008 10:51 AM EST up reply actions
There’s some pretty good research over at BP for what they called “secret sauce.”
I think there clearly are factors for postseason success that are a little different from the regular season, with the key tangible differences being the schedule and the quality of competition. Still, the immensely high variance of a handful of baseball games is a far more powerful force than the difference between regular-season goodness (third-order wins, I guess) and secret sauce.
BP’s secret sauce:
As Dayn Perry and I found in Baseball Between the Numbers, regular season success is no guarantee of playoff performance. Rather, there are three particular characteristics of teams that win more than their share of post-season games. These characteristics are as follows:
1. A power pitching staff, as measured by normalized strikeout rate.
2. A good closer, as measured by WXRL.
3. A good defense, as measured by FRAA.
Of the dozens of team characteristics that we tested for statistical significance, in terms of their relationship with winning post-season games and series, these were the only three that mattered. Ending the year hot doesn’t make a whit of difference, for example, nor does having a veteran club, or a smallball offense.
The best thing probably is to hit [Grady] 2nd -- Jay
by Buckeye Brad on Nov 27, 2008 8:50 PM EST up reply actions
Right, that’s the stuff. Keep in mind, though, that the list is still highly dependent on the phrase “more than their share.”
First, what secret sauce describes is not which teams win in the postseason, but which teams win more than they should have been expected to win. Meaning, if one team is clearly stronger than the other to begin with, Secret Sauce is unlikely to tip the balance.
Second, how are they defining “more than their share?” I would guess they’re talking about third-order win percentage, but the point is, obviously it matters how one defines that.
Right. And as you have said, anything can happen in a 7-game series anyways, so even a team with all the right secret sauce ingredients can still lose to a team with none of them. This just tells what factors “help” you more in the playoffs, as opposed to the cliches like having a veteran team or postseaon experience.
The best thing probably is to hit [Grady] 2nd -- Jay
by Buckeye Brad on Nov 28, 2008 9:11 AM EST up reply actions
There’s a huge difference between grounders on 50% of your BIP and grounders on 60% – especially for guys like Laffey who will never strike many batters out.
Why didn’t you just say that the difference is 10%?
I’m being a little ignorant here intentionally, to point out that using descriptive words like “huge” in relation to the difference between his age 22 season in the bigs vs. his age 23 season (with injury I should add) is bending the facts (stats) to support your conclusion and win an argument. It also does nothing to refute the fact that over 50% is top 10 in the majors.
I understand that on avg. he is going to have more BIP than a pitcher that has a higher K/9, but to be fair, said pitcher also has to have a similar BB/9 as Laffey (since Laffey is good in this area as well) and now you are talking about even fewer pitchers. And even then you only are considering about 4 more hitters a game having at-bats that result in BIP, of which 50% result in a GB, 20% LD, 30% FB. Sure I’d rather it be 60/20 GB/FB, but I don’t see the difference as being “huge” when 4 more hitters than a guy with 8 K/9 and equal BB/9 put a BIP over a course of a game that will often result in a GB. More to the point, the difference isn’t “huge” its simply a difference of 10% that impacts the sample size of roughly 4 more hitters a game putting the ball in play than a pitcher with controlled (i.e. similar BB/9) BB/9 and a K/9 around 8. This of course doesn’t control for GB% and there was exactly one qualified (IP) starting pitchers who had an GB% over 50% and had 8 K/9 or better (Roy Halladay) this past season in the majors.
Laffey is a good pitcher. He probably will not develop into more than a middle-of-the-rotation pitcher unless he significantly ups the amount of strikeouts he gets. As is, he looks like he’s likely to be similar to Jake Westbrook, who is generally about 10% better than league average.
As for the 50% vs 60%, let’s run some numbers.
Let’s say Laffey pitches 200 innings. Let’s say he gives up 215 hits, strikes out 4.5 per nine, and walks 2 per nine. That’s 100 strikeouts and 44 walks.
So what’s the difference between getting 50% grounders and 60% grounders?
If Laffey gets 50% grounders, 20% line drives, and 30% fly balls, he’d get 216 fly balls in the above scenario. If a league average amount of those fly balls became homers (10-11%), he’d give up about 22 homers.
However, if Laffey ups that grounder percentage to 60%, at the expense of his fly balls, he’d give up only 144 fly balls, and 14-15 homers.
Saving seven or eight homers over a season is worth at least a win (10 runs), and perhaps more (depending on whether the homers are solo, 2-run, etc.). It’s likely that a reduction of 7-8 HRs is worth closer to two wins.
In terms of ERA, a reduction of 15 runs takes a pitcher with a 4.50 ERA and reduces that ERA to 3.83. Or, in other words, it takes a league average ERA and makes it 18% better than league average.
And that doesn’t take into account the additional benefits of ground balls, such as increased amount of double plays, and the fact that when ground balls become hits, they usually are singles.
While 10% may not seem like a big deal, for a guy like Laffey it could mean the difference between being league average and being 15-20% better than average.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 4:04 PM EST up reply actions
Your extrapolation to a full season’s worth of numbers is fair enough. Although I find a little contradiction in your last sentence and your belief that Laffey is Jake Westbrook (i.e. 10% above avg.) at best.
If Laffey can hit ‘05/’06 Jake Westbrook than you are looking at a top 20 AL starting pitcher (based on FIP for example).
In my last sentence I didn’t mean to imply that Laffey was necessarily league average with a 50% GB rate. In fact, I think he’d be somewhat below average with that GB rate (assuming he didn’t up his K rate).
I’m not sure what you mean by the comment about 05/06 Westbrook, as his ERA+ in those years was 93 and 108.
Still, the comparison to Jake Westbrook illustrates Laffey’s value. He may “only” be 10% above league average – but Westbrook signed a 3-year deal for $12 million per season that was widely regarded as below market value.
So “just” 10% above average has a significant amount of value.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 5:08 PM EST up reply actions
Well Laffey’s ERA+ for 2008 (with 50% GB rate) was 105. SSS be damned! His luck stats were all league avg. (baBIP, LD, HR/FB, LOB). So I don’t see how you can think that he’d be a below league avg. starter with a 50% GB rate. At least based on your argument that Jake Westbrook’s 05/06 seasons should be discounted due to his ERA+.
Those two season’s saw Westbrook put up FIPs below 4.00. His 05 season had him being unlucky in LOB (62) and HR/FB (19) impacting the ERA+.
In any case you and I are in agreement here:
So "just" 10% above average has a significant amount of value.
I’m not sure where to find this, but it seems that 15% of one’s runs allowed being unearned seems a little high. My guess is that its above the league average.
The secret here is that you are correct Clark in your general point. I was only playing a little game with Peter’s use of ERA+ to discount Westbrook’s 05/06 seasons when more fielding and luck independent stats showed he was pretty darn good those years. Of course Laffey didn’t pitch that well this past season, well I’d say around the time he was sent down that is, but he did pitch almost on par with Westbrook’s best season in Laffey’s rookie season as a 22 yr old, and was in fact unlucky that year to a degree.
I don’t buy the extrapolation. You are using averages to make a case, but all fly balls are not created equal. Fly balls can be fairly harmless if hitters consistently fail to get wood on the ball. An example of a successful fly ball pitcher is Bob Howry. While hitters tend to hit his pitches upward, he avoids the pain of failing as a major league reliever. While I agree that it’s an advantage to have a hitter hit a ball hard into the dirt, I would not dismiss a good fly ball pitcher for that reason.
This is simply not supported by the evidence.
Yes, it’s possible that some pitchers can control whether their fly balls become homers. But this control is minimal at best, and very tough to distinguish from random statistical fluctuation. The simple fact is that fly balls become homers approximately 10-11% of the time, and any significant deviation from that is likely random fluctuation.
No one is dismissing fly ball pitchers. But they give up homers at the same rate as ground ball pitchers.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 26, 2008 10:02 PM EST up reply actions
I think you misunderstand my point. Which is that the statistics for homers per fly ball are based on the average pitcher’s abilities. Among that population of pitchers, I imagine there are pitchers whose homers per fly ball stats are well above average. And that their success is ongoing and repeatable. And that the success is a result of preventing hitters from getting average or above average contact. I would imagine that good knuckleball pitchers give up fewer home runs per fly ball than fast ball pitchers. Or that fast ball pitchers with above average movement give up fewer home runs per fly ball than fast ball pitchers with less movement.
So, there are 715 balls in play in Peter’s first model. Peter’s comparison assumes that K rate remains intact, and that only flyballs are affected. Is that how it would happen? Peter, I also can’t tell if you’re adjusting for the likelihood of certain batted balls going for hits, which would of course give you a different BIP total.
Helium Watch: Chuck Lofgren, OF
No, I’m just saying that given the same number of batters faced, a 60% groundball pitcher induces 20% more groundballs than a 50% groundball pitcher.
Here’s a better point.
We had 82 title-qualified starters in 2008, and they ranged from 32.0% to 64.2% groundball rates, and the middle 80% ranged from 37.4% to 52.1%.
So you could say that 37% is the “replacement-level groundball rate,” and then the question is, how many marginal groundballs is each pitcher producing?
Well, 10% of qualified starters were sub-marginal, and 80% produced from zero to 15% marginal groundballs, and assuming typical 800 batters faced, each percentage point is worth 8 groundballs … so the bulk of qualified starters induced between zero and 120 marginal groundballs. That’s a lot of groundballs, and Laffey is near the top of that “bulk” group.
Now, you got a guy with a 60% groundball rate, we’re talking about 184 marginal groundballs induced over the course of the season, and we’re also talking about 64 more groundballs than the best of the “bulk” group.
Does that help?
One more little detail is that the median is just under 44, so a guy like Laffey is getting an extra 7.2, so that’s an extra 58 groundballs above a median, full-time starting pitcher, over the course of the season.
here’s where you lose me in your piece:
Huff is not particularly dominant
I would say, Huff has been particularly dominant. No, we can’t say for sure whether that will continue at the big league level. But Huff has been dominant. 25% K/PA is very good, 5:1 K:BB is very good. Again, I feel like “throws very hard” and “potential to be dominant” are being conflated.
There are very, very few pitchers who dominate without throwing hard. And the guys that do dominate without throwing too hard usually have a fantastic secondary pitch.
Velocity isn’t everything, certainly. But it does matter. Especially when addressing a pitcher’s ceiling.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:33 PM EST up reply actions
Been doing some thinking about how the Indians acquire hard throwers recently. It’s just a thing I do — I’m in love with the radar gun. But the club’s record of getting those guys into the majors, with one 300-lb exception, is pretty dismal. Jason Davis?
It can’t be accidental. Either upper-90s guys are too rare, or they’re too volatile, or both.
by fleerdon on Nov 25, 2008 1:48 PM EST up reply actions
Caveat, I guess Fausto could throw 98 if he aimed for Row 10 and threw straight. But who wants that?
by fleerdon on Nov 25, 2008 1:49 PM EST up reply actions
Agreed. And they cost too much and are generally not worth it.
Point remains, though: there are very pitchers who truly dominate without throwing hard. And that’s why velocity is so highly valued.
by Peter Bendix on Nov 25, 2008 1:50 PM EST up reply actions
when there are 157 new comments on a topic that i just checked this morning, i just z through the entire thing and assume brilliant ideas were proposed, debated, and debunked, hoping to find a poorly-done microsoft paint creation in the middle somewhere.
good job, fellas.
i think.
You know Selig? Ombudsman.
Some highlights: Huff is going to be a really good pitcher; no, wait, he’s got promise, but not that much. Shoppach has a lot of trade value; no, wait, he strikes out too much; but, wait, he has a ton of power. Shapiro undervalues our prospects; no, wait, he actually doesn’t. A no. 2 starter is a pitcher who is almost as good as CC (Chuck demurs in absentia); no, wait, CC is a no. 1+ pitcher, so that’s not a reasonable comparison. We need a reliever; no, wait, we need a starter.
Overall summary: we’re all desperate for something concrete to talk about and await spring baseball with real interest — Hey, Mark Shapiro: make a move so we can argue about actions, not theory!
by peter m on Nov 25, 2008 3:55 PM EST up reply actions 5 recs
This is like a SportsCenter “teams on 20” update.
I watch too much ESPN.
The best thing probably is to hit [Grady] 2nd -- Jay
by Buckeye Brad on Nov 25, 2008 4:45 PM EST up reply actions
ERRR, I think frequency of groundball inducement is an overrated statistic, since it doesn’t factor in meteorological conditions and the fact that Rafael Perez keeps tugging on that string on his glove, indicating there’s probably a hole in it………………..
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