Transactions: February 18-24, 2010
Announced that General Manager Mark Shapiro will become team President after the 2010 season
Announced that Assistant General Manager Chris Antonetti will become General Manager after the 2010 season
After Chris Antonetti interviewed for the St. Louis Cardinals GM position, he was given greater responsibilities in the Indians front office and a new title, but more importantly, was named the successor to Mark Shapiro as Indians General Manager. Which made sense, since Shapiro wasn't planning on leaving the organization, but moving up to the top of club operations. I think these moves had already been planned since the winter of 2008, waiting for the right moment to be put in place.This allows both Shapiro and Antonetti to remain in the organization together.
During the Shapiro-Antonetti era, the on-field results have been largely poor. There was a unexpected near-miss in 2005 and an ALCS team in 2007, but also three major disappointments in 2006, 2008, and especially in 2009. The rebuilding process (2003-2005) was well executed, but once the rebuilding was over, the organization didn't transition well to a contending process. In other words, maintaining the roster so that the team would be in contention on a consistent basis. The player development pipeline dried up, not allowing the Indians to replace their departing stars with prospects that could eventually be their equals. Although the draft is only one part of amateur acquisition, the Indians' failure to hit even doubles with their high picks contributed in part to the trades of Cliff Lee and Victor Martinez last summer. So Paul Dolan's effusive praise of the two in last week's press conference rings hollow, for executive awards and stellar business plans don't directly translate into success on the baseball field, as we have most painfully seen.
The timing for this move does make sense. Antonetti will have a lot of flexibility (at least as much as a mid-market team can have) in building the Indians back into a contender. The minor-league system has been restocked thanks to last season's trades, and after this season the only real major contract left on the roster will be Travis Hafner's deal. Shapiro will be the titular GM through what looks to be a painful rebuilding season, though obviously Chris will have a major say in what happens between now and October. Certainly Chris will have even more of a say in any move with reverberations into the 2011 season and beyond. If the team progresses as hoped, Antonetti should be taking over a club that can win the AL Central.
Signed 1B Russell Branyan to a 1 Year, $2M Contract (2011 Mutial Option)
Branyan can also receive up to $1M in performance-based incentives. It seems like he's going to be the starting first baseman, which means Matt LaPorta would move to left field. So the lineup will have a lot more power, but at the expense of speed at the top of the lineup (Michael Brantley, who would most likely be pushed to AAA). Keep in mind that LaPorta, Branyan, and Hafner are all injury risks to varying extents, so I'd count on Brantley getting considerable at-bats no matter what the Opening Day configuration is.
Outrighted IF Chris Gimenez to Columbus (AAA)
Purchased the Contract of RHP Anthony Reyes; Placed him on the 60-Day Disabled List
Gimenez wasn't going to make the Opening Day Roster, so the Indians didn't sacrifice anything in adding Branyan to the 40-man roster. Reyes needed to be added to the roster in order for the Indians to retain control of him, so they purchased his contract and then immediately placed him on the 60-day DL, thus they didn't have to remove a healthy player from the roster.
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55 comments
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Comments
Interesting side comment in Buster Olney’s blog today.
He basically says he’s “heard” there are real concerns about LaPorta’s patience at the plate.
Then he cites raw walk numbers in both the bigs and minors.
Found this interesting.
LaPorta walked about 6% of the time last season in the bigs and most projections have that up to 8% this season, which over an entire season works out between 40 and 50 walks.
Those same projections have him around .330-.340 for an OBP. And around .800 for OPS.
LaPorta hasn’t had a full season of continuous work at any level – but his longest stretches were 2008 in Huntsville (366 PAs) and 2009 in Columbus (393 PAs). In those stings his BB/PA numbers were 12.3% and 10.7%, respectively, both very solid numbers. I’m going to hold off on my concern for the time being.
As am I. But, if Olney’s sources are good, there’s apparently concern from the Tribe.
by FallsTribeFan on Feb 25, 2010 10:56 AM EST up reply actions
I have never been 100% high on LaPorta. All we really have to go on is how much the scouts have always loved his bat. As you well know, he has never graded out as an exceptional prospect based on Progress Score.
If you watch LaPorta at the plate he shows signs of being a hitter, but he doesn’t really convince you he’ll be a primo hitter the way Jay Buhner did in his age 23 season with New York and (even moreso) Seattle.
There may not be much disagreement about LaPorta. He projects to be someone who can man 1b or LF for us for cheap for a handful of years and possibly rank in the middle of first baseman. Good to enough to hit in the middle of our order. Not a multiple all-star or anything, but a solid regular.
That’s a valuable type.
Though I look right at home, I still feel like an exile
by Manhattan Tribe Fan on Feb 25, 2010 10:50 PM EST up reply actions
Konerko had a great age-23 season with the White Sox. I can’t find the details, but he had suffered a career-threatening hip injury (as I remember) when he was with the Dodgers. He also had some amazing seasons in the PCL (hitter friendly, noted). I’d say poor man’s Konerko might be more like it.
Yep. Although anyone projecting him to be a good defensive outfielder has given him some upside beyond that.
Any assessment of his defensive value that goes beyond “minimal” is off the mark. He could be a slightly above-average LF, but who cares? I guess I’m just saying the difference between that and Konerko is not significant in the overall value equation.
I’m not entirely convinced that we have that good of a handle on how to quantify outfield defense. The only thing I feel comfortable saying is that the Indians don’t value defense as highly as most organizations. Tell me I’m wrong.
by dgcambridge on Feb 26, 2010 11:27 AM EST up reply actions
Scouts respected Garko’s bat-to-ball ability, but let’s keep things in perspective. He was a fourth-rounder despite possibly being useful as a catcher. LaPorta was seen as an adequate corner defender at best, and yet he was the #7 overall pick in the draft. There’s a world of difference between what the scouts thought about LaPorta vs. Garko.
by Jay on Mar 2, 2010 9:39 PM EST up reply actions
According to Tony Lastoria, Brantley is likely headed to AAA with LaPorta getting most AB’s in LF and playing 1B part time against LHP.
How does everyone feel about Brantley moving to AAA?
btw, I’m not concerned with LaPorta’s plate discipline yet. Let’s see how he does in a full season first, and even then we can’t say for sure if it will be a problem or a plus.
I’m really not worried about Brantley. Let him force the issue. I feel his 2009 has become a little overstated; he put up a .707 OPS in the majors, a .711 in AAA. In a corner. I think Brantley has a chance to be a neat player but he’s hardly beating down the door.
Tony’s pretty adamant that he thinks Brantley is still going to start the year in Cleveland (check out the main article and Comment 5).
All things considered, I’m ok with it.
If he had struggled in his trial last year, we would probably all be citing his age as a reason to keep developing him.
I’m going to be careful here to not fall in love with the small sample size, and say a little more seasoning (plus managing his service time) isn’t the worst idea.
My question is who backs up CF? Kearns or Choo?
And does the Branyan addition keep Marte off the roster?
I’m assuming LaPorta now gets 1B time when Branyan sits, with Kearns in LF.
That’s what I’m thinking. Unless they keep Brantley that is.
by clusterchuck on Feb 25, 2010 5:07 PM EST up reply actions
Although the draft is only one part of amateur acquisition, the Indians’ failure to hit even doubles with their high picks contributed in part to the trades of Cliff Lee and Victor Martinez last summer.
Ryan, as ever, finds twenty words that say two thousand. But this sums up my feelings perfectly. Failure to get Hotshot Prospect #23,958? Not as big a deal as people think. Failure to get meaningful MLB innings from the draft for years on end? Kind of a big deal.
by fleerdon on Feb 25, 2010 1:37 PM EST reply actions
Would you agree that player acquisition is just that? That it doesn’t matter how you get ‘em as long as you get ’em? If your forte is trading, then it offsets weaknesses in drafting. If your forte is signing FAs, then it offsets weaknesses those in other areas. Cleveland is fielding a team containing several prospects that project bright futures. It doesn’t matter how they got here.
I’d say it matters. Having good prospects from the draft may help you avoid having to trade away your best ML players in order to get those same good prospects. Being able, by luck or skill, to get good prospects in the draft while not benefitting from a high slot (meaning your big league team doesn’t suck) is better than relying on a top 5 pick all the time. Finding an international FA and signing him cheaper than someone else who got in a bidding war for another guy of equal talent is a better deal.
I agree with the basic premise that you acquire good players however you can. But it does matter how you do it – some ways are better than others.
You know we are going to have to trade our best players anyway due to financial reasons. You may as well recognize that as part of the overall acquisition strategy.
Sure it is, but its not a flat formula, “wait 2 years and trade”. How long you can keep your best players, and being in the position where you have more options to extend this guy or that, is directly related to the fortunes of the major league club.
Financial resources, for the Indians at least, are directly tied to attendance, which is directly tied to the team’s performance. If we hadn’t tanked directly after ’07 and continued fielding a competitive team, we might have been able to extend one of our “best”.
Without maintaining a certain level of performance at the big league level, then it does become, like xrickx and Ryan succinctly state below, just a rotation of prospects.
It does matter if the goal is sustainable success at the major league level.
Building a strong minor-league system through the acquisition of prospects for your veterans is not a way to build a sustainable major league club. It is a sustainable way to build a strong minor league system. The former is the goal. The latter is symptom of a great problem. It’s a nice symptom to have, but it means something, somewhere went wrong.
Building a strong minor-league system through the acquisition of prospects for your veterans is not a way to build a sustainable major league club. It is a sustainable way to build a strong minor league system.
Yeah, it’s the equivalent of trading your harvested crop for next year’s seeds.
by Ryan on Feb 26, 2010 1:35 AM EST up reply actions 1 recs
The rebuilding process (2003-2005) was well executed, but once the rebuilding was over, the organization didn’t transition well to a contending process. In other words, maintaining the roster so that the team would be in contention on a consistent basis. The player development pipeline dried up, not allowing the Indians to replace their departing stars with prospects that could eventually be their equals. Although the draft is only one part of amateur acquisition, the Indians’ failure to hit even doubles with their high picks contributed in part to the trades of Cliff Lee and Victor Martinez last summer. So Paul Dolan’s effusive praise of the two in last week’s press conference rings hollow, for executive awards and stellar business plans don’t directly translate into success on the baseball field, as we have most painfully seen.
This is all true, and well written. But I just want to stress that the word “contributed” is correct here, because while we like to point out the draft problems over and over again, the other huge part of the story was the failure of our core guys in 2008 and 2009. (Obviously, a lot of those failures were due to injury, if that matters to you.)
The two problems worked together to get us in the hole; a success in either area might have helped cover for the other.
But I don’t like to leave out that part of the story.
I will continue to maintain that our 08-09 collapse had only two significant components. First, the collapse of our quality depth in the rotation. We got zero production out of Carmona and Westbrook, which nobody would have predicted at the end of 2007, and which nobody would have said would be easy to overcome. Yes, Cliff Lee did amazing things, but those were countered by a total lack of production from the upper minors, i.e., Miller and Sowers. Second, the inability to put together a decent bullpen over those two seasons, which was not only performance failure but a very high-leverage one. Here, too, the minors weren’t helping much, but the core failure was still at the major league level.
I would contend that if the minor-league depth was there (especially in the rotation), then the Indians would have stuck around in contention a lot longer, at the very least be in striking distance (considering the competition) at the beginning of August. You’d still chalk up the failures to core players being injured and/or under producing, but you wouldn’t have had to radically retool your roster just to get back to an AL Central level of contention.

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