Many of us are eagerly awaiting the arrival of Francisco Lindor and Giovanny Urshela (or perhaps a free agent third baseman instead of Urshela) to shore up the Tribe’s defense at shortstop and third base, respectively.
Our sense of anticipation, obviously, has to be tempered by the knowledge that whoever plays has to be able to hit at an adequate major league level in order to hold his position in the lineup. For the sake of keeping this post simple (and myself sane), I am simply going to cross my fingers and hope along with all other LGTers that both Lindor and Urshela will be able to hit adequately or better.
Though there are more sophisticated measures for determining a player’s defensive value than simply counting his errors, the number of errors committed by a player is one of the most important indicators of his defensive value.
Thus far this season, Tribe shortstops have committed 17 errors and its third basemen 26 errors. A measure of how much room there is for improvement at these positions is that the AL teams with the fewest errors at shortstop are Minnesota with 7 and the Angels with 8. The teams with the fewest errors at third are Seattle with 8 and the Angels and TB with 9 each.
By way of contrast to the players who have played shortstop and third for the Indians this year, in 92 games at Columbus Urshela has 4 errors. In his 25 games as a Clipper, Lindor has only 1.
In thinking about the contribution these two players can make to the Tribe’s overall success, it is important to consider the key defensive role traditionally played by the shortstop and how the increasing use of the defensive infield shift has perhaps amplified the defensive roles of both the shortstop and the third baseman. Let me begin, though, with the percentage of defensive chances handled at each position.
In his chapter on defense in Men At Work, George Will talked about the importance of the shortstop. He said:
Shortstop is the most important defensive position. (Or, to stop some arguments before they start, let us say it is the most important defensive position in fair territory.) One reason it is so important is that most batters are right-handed and right-handers more often than not hit to the left side of the infield. Another reason is that the shortstop must cover more ground than the second baseman, and must have a stronger arm for throwing to first base from deep in the hole near third. In 1988 the percentage of batted balls put in play to each position was:
catcher 1
pitcher 6
first base 10
second base 13
third base 12
shortstop 15
left field 13
center field 18
right field 12
When baseball people talk about sound defense "up the middle" they mean primarily the middle infielders (shortstop and second basemen) and the centerfielder. In 1988 they handled 46% of all balls put in play.
So as recently as 1988 (I doubt that the numbers have changed much since then, though the increased use of the defensive shift may have affected them a bit) about 1 out of every 6 2/3 defensive chances was handled by the shortstop and a little over 1 out of every 8 was handled by the third baseman. If Lindor is the elite defensive talent and Urshela is the good defensive talent we have heard about, we can anticipate that 27% of all defensive plays are now going to be handled by much better players than the people who have made those plays this season. This holds out the possibility of the Tribe moving from league-worst (3B) or near league-worst (SS) to near league-best in terms of errors committed at these positions.
If this comes to pass, it will mean that defensive innings which were extended by errors this season will be foreshortened next year, thereby decreasing the number of runs allowed. It will also mean that Tribe pitchers will have to throw fewer pitches, which should allow starters to work deeper into games and relievers to be less stressed, which should also decrease the number of runs allowed.
In thinking about the defensive value of these two positions, it may also be useful to think about the evolved roles the shortstop and third baseman play when a defensive shift is employed.
What I have seen at the ballpark this year is several variations of the shift. In most cases, the third baseman will simply move to the traditional shortstop position, with the shortstop moving to the traditional second base position. I have also seen situations, however, in which teams employ the shift by having the third baseman stay at third until there is one strike on a batter and then have him switch positions with the shortstop and play at the traditional 2B position, who will move back to the traditional shortstop position from the traditional second base defensive position he has occupied under the shift. My assumption is that this last-mentioned version of the shift is utilized in order to make optimal use of a typical third baseman’s experience charging bunts until a strike count has been reached in which bunting is less likely—at which point it becomes more important to the team to have the shortstop back at the shortstop position because he has better range, a better glove, and a better arm.
In any event, I have begun to think that the meaning of being "strong up the middle" may have changed a bit since the concept of "the middle" is now changing—from batter to batter and sometimes from pitch to pitch. Maybe I am over-analyzing this, but it just makes sense to me that if a team’s shortstop is expected to play the entire area between 3B and 2B, better range, a better glove, and a better arm will all take on even greater significance. It also makes sense to me that a third baseman’s defensive skills are even more important if he is the sole defender between 3B and 2B.
If someone has already analyzed this issue on a sabermetrics basis, I would appreciate being directed to this analysis. I will be surprised, however, if it doesn’t show that the increased use of the shift has also increased the value of range, glove, and arm for both the shortstop and third baseman. If so, then the defensive value of Lindor and Urshela might be even greater.